A general model of international interactions and peace economics

Raymond Dacey

International Interactions, 1995, vol. 21, issue 2, 155-180

Abstract: This paper arises from some recent discussions of Peace Economics (Dacey, 1994a; Isard, 1994; Polachek, 1994; and Tinbergen, 1994). The purpose of the paper is to provide a model that integrates the seemingly disparate disciplines of international relations, domestic politics, and international business, and thereby provide a unified model of international interactions and peace economics. I present a model of international interactions based on a three‐part system of games—political games played between nations by governments, business games played between nations by firms, and pressure games played within and between nations by governments and firms: The games in the first component of this system are generally referred to as international relations games and those in the second as international business games. The games in the third component do not have a familiar name; I will call them pressure games. Here I outline the three components of this system, sketch the structure of the overall system, delineate some of the particular games, and try to establish the interconnections between and among these games. I conclude with some comments about the analytical tools that remain to be developed as Peace Economics, in particular, and International Political Economy, in general, advance.

Date: 1995
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434864

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