Fighting in Bosnia: An expected utility evaluation of possible settlements

Francine Friedman and Ismene Gizelis

International Interactions, 1997, vol. 23, issue 3-4, 351-365

Abstract: The military conflict over the future of Bosnia was long and vicious. In this article we analyze the negotiation period over two years utilizing the expected utility model. We demonstrate the merits of modeling in capturing the dynamics of the bargaining process. We show that the progressive shift in American policies was the catalyst that led to the Dayton agreement. We conclude that if the United States maintains an active role, the local actors will not challenge its institutional framework. If American troops withdraw from the area before securing peace, conflict will reignite.

Date: 1997
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434915

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