When biased advice is a good thing: Information and foreign policy decision making

Marissa Myers

International Interactions, 1998, vol. 24, issue 4, 379-403

Abstract: The conventional wisdom holds that good advisors are unbiased and neutral. Calvert's (1985) rational choice model of political advice challenges this view. Following Calvert, I argue that biased sources of information are useful to decision makers because an unexpected recommendation from a biased advisor alerts a decision maker to the deleterious consequences of a policy proposal, providing ex ante information that a neutral advisor cannot. Such advice is particularly salient to political leaders who are held accountable for foreign policy mistakes. In this paper, I apply a model of political advice, assess its implications for foreign policy decision making, and analyze three historical examples of foreign policy decision making that illustrate the impact of biased advice.

Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629808434936

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