The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory

Stephen Quackenbush

International Interactions, 2004, vol. 30, issue 2, 87-107

Abstract: Rational choice theory has long been criticized, with several recent critiques of applications in political science in general and international relations in particular. In this paper, I seek to clarify discussion about rationality in several ways. I discuss the role of assumptions in theory and the assumption of rationality in rational choice theory. I demonstrate that many critiques of rational choice theory have been misguided , since instrumental rationality-the rationality of rational choice theory-is applicable to a wide variety of social situations, including situations where various psychological, informational, and structural factors claimed to interfere with rational decision-making are present. I also focus on three applications of rational choice theory in international relations that demonstrate ways that rational choice theorists have potentially added to confusion about the rationality assumption and created disillusionment in others about the rational choice enterprise. Finally, I point out that, since rational choice theory is not a single theory, critics' claims about the non-falsifiability of rational choice are immaterial. An understanding of these issues facilitates movement by the international relations community away from argument over the assumption of rationality and on to more productive and integrative theory building.

Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620490462595 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:2:p:87-107

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GINI20

DOI: 10.1080/03050620490462595

Access Statistics for this article

International Interactions is currently edited by Michael Colaresi and Gerald Schneider

More articles in International Interactions from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().