The Dynamics of Bargaining and War

Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner

International Interactions, 2007, vol. 33, issue 1, 31-50

Abstract: Filson and Werner (2002) introduce a formal model of bargaining and war to explore conditions under which states that can negotiate settlements choose to initiate and terminate violence. Filson and Werner (2004) apply the model to obtain testable hypotheses about the impact of regime type on war onset, duration, and outcomes. The model could provide a basis for a formal rational actor model of power transition with economic and political variables. However, additional dynamic structure would have to be added; Filson and Werner (2002, 2004) focus on simple environments. In this paper we begin to consider more complex dynamic environments using computational techniques. In doing so, we explore the conditions under which wars endure. The results clarify how the initial distribution of resources (power) and benefits, beliefs, and regime type affect whether wars begin, how quickly they end, and what deals are made.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1080/03050620601155656

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