After Sarajevo: Explaining the Blank Check

Frank C. Zagare

International Interactions, 2009, vol. 35, issue 1, 106-127

Abstract: This paper uses an incomplete information game model to describe and explain the so-called blank check issued to Austria by Germany in early July 1914. It asks why Germany would cede control of an important aspect of its foreign policy to another lesser power. The derived explanation is consistent not only with the actual beliefs of German and Austrian leaders but also with an equilibrium prediction of the game model. The issue of whether unconditional German support of Austria constituted either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the outbreak of major power war the next month is also addressed.

Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1080/03050620902743960

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