The Two-Level Game of Transnational Networks: The Case of the Access to Medicines Campaign

Jean-Frédéric Morin

International Interactions, 2010, vol. 36, issue 4, 309-334

Abstract: The rapid emergence of transnational networks in world politics calls for an analysis of their power dynamics. By combining the advocacy network literature and the two-level game theory in an innovative manner, this article provides a theoretical conceptualization of the interplay between intra- and inter-network interactions. It argues that the strength of a network as agent springs from its force as a structure. A network win-set is determined by its internal games, thereby affecting both its bargaining power and its chance to reach a consensual agreement with other networks. The issue of access to medicines is used as a factual background to illustrate how the flow of influence within networks affects influence among networks.

Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.523656

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