Civil War Settlements, Size of Governing Coalition, and Durability of Peace in Post--Civil War States

Madhav Joshi and T. David Mason

International Interactions, 2011, vol. 37, issue 4, 388-413

Abstract: We examine the ways in which the size of the governing coalition in a post--civil war state affects the durability of the peace. Previous studies relate the durability of the peace to the outcome of the civil war, the extent and forms of power-sharing arrangements, and the role of third-party security guarantors. We argue that the way conflict terminates and the power-sharing agreements between former protagonists structure the composition of governing coalition in the post--civil war state. Any settlement to civil war that broadens the size of the governing coalition should increase actors' incentives to sustain the peace rather than renew the armed conflict. Peace is more likely to fail where the governing coalition is smaller because those excluded from the governing coalition have little to lose from resuming armed rebellion. To test these propositions, we analyze data on post--civil war peace spells from 1946--2005.

Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.622645

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