Helping without hurting: ameliorating the negative effects of humanitarian assistance on civil wars through mediation

J. Michael Greig

International Interactions, 2021, vol. 47, issue 1, 79-106

Abstract: A growing body of literature has suggested that, in the long-run, humanitarian aid, while well-intentioned, might be counter-productive to civil war conflict management because aid provides resources that help belligerents sustain their conflict, increasing the intensity of civil wars and lengthening their duration. This unintended consequence of humanitarian aid creates a paradox for policymakers. Those civil wars that are most resistant to settlement efforts generate the greatest need for humanitarian aid to limit the deadly effects of conflict on civilians. Yet, if humanitarian aid adds fuel to the fire of these same conflicts, making them more resistant to settlement and increasing the pain they impose upon civilians, policymakers might choose to avoid providing humanitarian assistance altogether in the hopes of hastening the end of the conflict. In this paper, I argue that while humanitarian aid can bring these unintended consequences, scholars have tended to overlook the way in which the combined effects of humanitarian aid and mediation can increase the likelihood of civil wars ending. I find that the combined effects of repeated mediation and high levels of humanitarian aid increase the likelihood both that conflicts will end and that they will terminate with peace agreements and cease-fires. This effect is especially strong for conflicts mediated by international organizations and major powers.

Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1814763 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:1:p:79-106

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GINI20

DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1814763

Access Statistics for this article

International Interactions is currently edited by Michael Colaresi and Gerald Schneider

More articles in International Interactions from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().