U.S. Military Training, External Support, and Security Defections during Nonviolent Resistance
Ilker Kalin and
Mustafa Kirisci
International Interactions, 2024, vol. 50, issue 3, 448-477
Abstract:
Why do some armed forces remain loyal to the regime while others switch sides during nonviolent uprisings? The existing research predominantly focuses on the roles of domestic actors and dynamics in explaining security defections. We extend this line of research by exploring external factors that might potentially affect troops’ decision to defect. In particular, we suggest a combined effect of U.S. military training and external support for campaigns on defection decisions. Our findings show that substantial Western power involvement in support of campaigns might induce security defections in militaries with which the U.S. military has established ties. We further probe this relationship by disaggregating Western power support into its constituents and find that security defections are most likely to occur when a campaign is backed by both the U.S. and at least one other Western power. This study contributes to an understudied aspect of security force defections during nonviolent campaigns, highlighting how external dynamics might shape militaries’ decisions regarding loyalty and defection.
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:3:p:448-477
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2331131
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