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Sequencing the Steps to War

Douglas B. Atkinson, Andrew P. Owsiak, Joshua Jackson and Rebecca Buechler

International Interactions, 2024, vol. 50, issue 5, 780-808

Abstract: According to the steps-to-war theory, the probability of war between two states rises as the involved states take four distinct steps—namely, initiate a territorial disagreement, enter a rivalry relationship, secure defensive allies, and initiate an arms race with one another. Our study explores the relationships between these four steps in greater detail. In particular, we ask whether the steps to war might unfold in a predictable (modal) sequence. After demonstrating that the theory contains the elements needed to think about the steps to war as a sequence of events, we theorize a modal steps-to-war sequence and derive a series of predictions about it. We then evaluate these predictions through path analysis (i.e. a structural equation model). The results not only confirm the existence of a modal sequence, but also overwhelmingly support the steps-to-war theory’s predictions, some of which we formalize and investigate for the first time. Most notably, we uncover evidence that territorial disagreements function as an underlying cause of war that drives the entire steps-to-war process. Contests over territory increase the probability of war both directly as well as indirectly, through the additional steps to war they encourage.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2378779

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