Domestic Support for Foreign Aid: Development Firms and Support for Foreign Aid in the US Congress

Doeun Kim

International Interactions, 2024, vol. 50, issue 5, 839-865

Abstract: In this article, I present a theory of domestic support for foreign aid in the United States, focusing on the role played by American development firms or aid awardees in domestic politics. US Agency for International Development (USAID) delivers foreign aid to recipient countries through contracts with private for-profit development firms and non-profit organizations, most of which originate from America. This article argues that these domestic firms promote domestic support for foreign aid by creating distributional effects and disseminating information through lobbying. This information includes not only the significance of foreign aid but also its distributive benefits to legislators’ districts. Analyzing district-level USAID award data and firm-level lobby data from the 111th to the 115th Congress, I found that the district-level allocation of aid awards is positively associated with the frequency of (co)sponsorship for pro-foreign aid bills.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2380464

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