Never fear to negotiate? Talks and rally effects

Matthew Fehrs

International Interactions, 2025, vol. 51, issue 3, 375-395

Abstract: Research on the concept of “rallying around the flag” has focused on the potential benefits for leaders under certain conditions of conflict. What has gone underexplored is whether leaders receive similar benefits for taking actions aimed at resolving conflicts, in particular negotiations with adversaries. The theory proposed in this paper argues that U.S. public opinion rallies for meetings with the Soviets will be conditioned on the subject of the meetings and voters’ partisanship. Democratic voters will favor meetings focused on managing global security issues while Republican partisans will look favorably upon meetings dealing with bilateral security issues. To investigate this theory, the paper employs a new dataset that looks at U.S. meeting with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Using 58 bilateral meetings between the superpowers, tests find strong support for the theory. The paper also discusses the possibility and limitations of using such meetings for diversionary purposes. The paper concludes by examining the implication that leaders benefit from negotiating.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2025.2480366

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