A Public Demand Theory of Economic Sanctions

Cora Caton and Clayton Webb

International Interactions, 2025, vol. 51, issue 3, 396-424

Abstract: A number of theories about the effectiveness, design, and targeting of economic sanctions highlight public perceptions of economic sanctions as an important factor influencing foreign policy decision making. Some even suggest that public pressure to respond to international events creates public demand for sanctions. Does public demand for economic sanctions exist? If so, what factors shape this demand? We develop a public-demand theory of economic sanctions that likens demand for sanctions to demand for any other good or service. Public demand is inversely related to the perceived costs of sanctions and demand for sanctions increases as a function of the public utility derived from sanctions. We test these propositions using a survey experiment. Our findings establish the microfoundations for arguments made in previous research and provide a solid foundation for future study and theoretical development.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2025.2489368

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