Over the long horizon: Party institutionalization and antidumping trade remedies

Tyler Coleman

International Interactions, 2025, vol. 51, issue 4, 639-667

Abstract: International political economy scholarship has documented that non-traditional barriers to international trade have proliferated since the 1970s. Contemporary explanations attribute these trends to a number of different factors, including retaliatory motives, exchange rate appreciations, business cycles, and deindustrialization. I reorient the analysis around domestic politics, arguing that governments with institutionalized parties should attract larger amounts of antidumping petition filings from firms. Additionally, governments should be more likely to supply final antidumping trade remedies to petitioning firms. I test this argument with an analysis of all available petition filing data collected from 33 countries between 1978 and 2020, finding support for these arguments.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2025.2518377 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:51:y:2025:i:4:p:639-667

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GINI20

DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2025.2518377

Access Statistics for this article

International Interactions is currently edited by Michael Colaresi and Gerald Schneider

More articles in International Interactions from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().