To punish or to reward? The effect of sanction threats on public opinion
Menevis Cilizoglu,
Efe Tokdemir and
Omer Zarpli
International Interactions, 2025, vol. 51, issue 4, 668-688
Abstract:
How do individuals respond to the threat of economic sanctions? Under what conditions do the target population demand policy concessions, and when do they rally behind their beleaguered leader? We investigate these questions through a survey experiment conducted in Türkiye in April 2021 with 2,522 participants. Our study examines the impact of three key factors on sanction threat effectiveness: the perceived credibility of sanctions imposition, the expected economic costs, and the anticipated benefits of compliance. Contrary to our expectations, we find little evidence that these factors enhance the effectiveness of sanction threats. Neither the prospect of economic hardship nor the promise of rewards significantly increases public support for concessions. Instead, our findings suggest that sanctions, particularly when paired with positive inducements, can provoke a backlash among certain groups, especially government supporters. These results highlight the limitations of sanction threats in societies with deeply held partisan identities.
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2025.2518382 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:51:y:2025:i:4:p:668-688
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GINI20
DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2025.2518382
Access Statistics for this article
International Interactions is currently edited by Michael Colaresi and Gerald Schneider
More articles in International Interactions from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().