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Cyber Conflict & Domestic Audience Costs

Ryan Shandler

International Interactions, 2026, vol. 52, issue 2, 270-294

Abstract: Cyber power is altering the nature of domestic audience costs. By exploiting voters’ captivation with cyber conflict, leaders can now de-escalate crises without having to worry about suffering domestic censure. Such is the allure of cyber power among the mass public that even minor cyberattacks with little operational impact can placate voters’ expectation of strong military force. In practice, this means that leaders who would otherwise be bound by domestic audience costs can “escape” by conducting disruptive cyberattacks that merely appear forceful to domestic constituents. To explore how cyber operations temper domestic escalatory pressures, I conduct a survey experiment that asks participants to evaluate presidential leadership following the deployment of cyber or conventional force. The findings confirm that the public view cyberattacks — even ephemeral, inconsequential cyberattacks — as sufficiently forceful to meet a leader’s threat of force and placate their zeal for military action. Offering examples of how this theory has played out in multiple real-world incidents, I demonstrate how public enthusiasm for cyber power adds newfound flexibility to crisis decision-making.

Date: 2026
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2025.2478145

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