RMA and Strategic intelligence: The case of China and Japan

Woondo Choi

Global Economic Review, 2004, vol. 33, issue 1, 51-67

Abstract: Two cases of China and Japan are compared in the two dimensions of strategic doctrine and the RMA program. China is disadvantaged in its general military capability; it cannot help but gain the initiative by striking first and doing the operation under a high degree of secrecy, mobility, accuracy in its concentration of firepower, and surprise. This is called the doctrine of “strategic attack” and the Chinese defense planning is called “strategic modernization.” On the other hand, the Japanese approach to RMA is called “Info-RMA”. The Japanese basic defense strategy is a passive one and it is critical to protect the information infrastructure as Japanese territories might turn out to be the battlefield. Japan should be ready for the possibility that some pre-RMA forces would employ asymmetrical means such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, or guerilla warfare. Self-Defense Forces (SDF) also should be ready to accomplish diverse missions, such as rear-area support for U.S. troops, as well as peacekeeping operations and disaster relief. It is ironic that the Chinese doctrine could not help but be aggressive to compensate for the weakness of strategic intelligence capability in comparison to the U.S. On the other hand, Japan could develop power-projection capability under the name of strategic intelligence as a part of the Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy.

Keywords: strategic attack; info-RMA; asymmetric war; power-projection capability; RMA (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1080/12265080408449841

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