The Global Financial Crisis Revisited: Competition and Regulation

Choi

Global Economic Review, 2013, vol. 42, issue 4, 362-381

Abstract: Using data of the systematic banking crises from 1981 to 2008, we examine how competition and regulation are related to the crises. We find that countries with higher concentration and/or higher market power of the banking industry are less prone to crises. Further, they are more likely to have weathered the 2008 global financial crisis. However, regulatory and institutional factors play little role and the estimation results are shown to be sensitive to measures of the degree of competition or severity of the crisis, as well as the coverage of the crises.

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1080/1226508X.2013.860709

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