Independence and Architecture of Financial Supervision: With Focus on the Effects on Banking Stability

Iljoong Kim and Inbae Kim

Global Economic Review, 2014, vol. 43, issue 4, 338-354

Abstract: Empirical work on the performances of supervisory governance and architecture is scarce relative to the intensifying debates on related institutional arrangements. Using an expansive panel data-set, this paper is a first attempt to explore the effects of governance, architecture and their interactions on banking stability. Empirical analyses reveal that independence matters, as a major governance factor, and the two critical architecture factors, the integration of authorities and the central bank' involvement undermine banking stability. Also, in spite of the interaction between independence and architecture, its effect appears to be limited.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/1226508X.2014.982318

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