The Political Processes of the Distinctive Multinational Factory Regime and Recent Strikes in Vietnam

Suhong Chae

Global Economic Review, 2018, vol. 47, issue 1, 88-104

Abstract: The period from the mid-2000s to the early 2010s is noteworthy in the history of industrial relations in Vietnam. On the one hand, the number of strikes increased, reaching its peak in 2011. On the other hand, there were much stronger signs that both the management and the workers were not satisfied with their “factory regime”, as a stable and predictable process to resolve labor disputes was yet to emerge. In addition to the previous economic and political explanations focused on macroeconomic conditions and political institutional arrangements at the national level, this article attempts to ethnographically explore and describe the political-economic conditions of both the workers and the managements on a micro level to answer the following questions: Why do some workers have to resort to uncomfortable and troublesome means such as wildcat strikes despite their better working conditions compared to those of workers in other factories? In contrast, what are the reasons that some factories do not offer their workers particularly favorable working conditions and wages and can still avoid strikes? While answering these questions, this article attempts to address the necessity of recognizing the distinctive political structure and processes in the multinational factory regime and to suggest ways of establishing more stable and productive industrial relations more suitable to the particularity of the factory regime.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/1226508X.2017.1393731 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:glecrv:v:47:y:2018:i:1:p:88-104

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RGER20

DOI: 10.1080/1226508X.2017.1393731

Access Statistics for this article

Global Economic Review is currently edited by Kap-Young Jeong and Taeyoon Sung

More articles in Global Economic Review from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().