Cooperation in Revision Games and Some Applications

Yuichiro Kamada and Michihiro Kandori

Global Economic Review, 2020, vol. 49, issue 4, 329-348

Abstract: The present paper provides some examples that illustrate how cooperation is achieved among rational and selfish agents when (i) they prepare their actions in advance and (ii) they have some opportunities to revise their actions. Specifically, we use the framework of revision games introduced by Kamada and Kandori [(2020). “Revision Games.” Econometrica 88: 1599–1630]. To judge the sustainability of cooperation in the examples, we show and utilise a simple and useful lemma.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/1226508X.2020.1836783

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