Interlocking Network, Banker Interlocking Director and Cost of Debt

Hyun-Jung Nam and Yohan An

Global Economic Review, 2023, vol. 52, issue 1, 71-92

Abstract: This study examines whether the cost of debt decreases when a banker interlocking director sits on the boards and exists within interlocking directors' network using a panel dataset during the period from 1998 to 2014.This study finds that the interlocking directors' network in Korea has gradually increased each year, and Korean firms' cost of debt is reduced when a banker interlocking director is participating on the boards and within interlocking directors' network. Specifically, Chaebols more strategically use a banker interlocking directors to lower the cost of debt than non-Chaebols. This result suggests that a banker interlocking director on boards with a strong firm network alleviates the burden of the cost of debt.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1080/1226508X.2023.2171458

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