Career Risk

Joachim Klement

Journal of Behavioral Finance, 2016, vol. 17, issue 4, 336-341

Abstract: The author defines asset manager career risk as the risk that asset owners terminate an existing manager due to an extended period of underperformance relative to a benchmark or peer group even though the manager has skill (defined here as positive information ratio). The author shows that myopic loss aversion gives rise to career risk even for skilled asset managers and that the current industry practice of quarterly or annual performance evaluations puts even the most skilled asset managers at risk of undue termination. The author also investigates how a reduction of tracking error leads to a reduction of career risk even though this comes at the expense of lower long-term performance. Finally, the author computes the minimum evaluation period needed to reduce career risk for asset managers of different skill levels.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/15427560.2016.1238375

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