Motives for Cooperation in the One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma

Mark Schneider and Timothy Shields

Journal of Behavioral Finance, 2022, vol. 23, issue 4, 438-456

Abstract: We investigate the motives for cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). A prior study finds that cooperation rates in one-shot PD games can be ranked empirically by the social surplus from cooperation. That study employs symmetric payoffs from cooperation in simultaneous PD games. Hence, in that setting, it is not possible to discern the motives for cooperation since three prominent social welfare criteria, social surplus (efficiency) preferences, Rawlsian maximin preferences, and inequity aversion make the same predictions. In the present paper, we conduct an experiment to identify which of these social preferences best explains differences in cooperation rates and to study the effects of the risk of non-cooperation.

Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/15427560.2022.2081974 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:hbhfxx:v:23:y:2022:i:4:p:438-456

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/hbhf20

DOI: 10.1080/15427560.2022.2081974

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Behavioral Finance is currently edited by Brian Bruce

More articles in Journal of Behavioral Finance from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().