Review of Guillaume Plantin and Jean-Charles Rochet, When Insurers Go Bust: An Economic Analysis of the Role and Design of Prudential Regulation

John Marshall

International Journal of the Economics of Business, 2009, vol. 16, issue 1, 139-146

Abstract: When Insurers Go Bust applies agency theory and the theories of adverse selection and moral hazard as the motivation for prudential regulation of insurance. The resulting scheme has strong flavors of verifiability, simplicity, consistency, and transparency. In consequence, ruin theory does not have an operational role. Theory is applied in familiar ways that are at best convenient shorthand for correct ideas and at worst acceptably suggestive. As in other sources, there is inappropriate emphasis on the general theory of excessive risk-taking, which tends to deflect attention from the specific nature of insurance firms, but the theoretical excess is adequately counterbalanced by thoughtful case studies. This book is useful for the insurance scholar and feasible as a segment of an advanced undergraduate course.

Keywords: Moral Hazard; Adverse Selection; Agency Theory; Insurance Regulation; Ruin Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13571510802638999 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:16:y:2009:i:1:p:139-146

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/CIJB20

DOI: 10.1080/13571510802638999

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of the Economics of Business is currently edited by Eleanor Morgan

More articles in International Journal of the Economics of Business from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().