Profit Shifting in Two-Sided Markets

Dirk Schindler and Guttorm Schjelderup

International Journal of the Economics of Business, 2010, vol. 17, issue 3, 373-383

Abstract: We investigate how multinational two-sided platform firms set their prices on intra-firm transactions. Two-sided platform firms derive income from two customer groups that are connected through at least one positive network externality from one group to the other. A main finding is that, even in the absence of taxation, transfer prices deviate from marginal cost of production. A second result of the paper is that it is inherently difficult to establish arm's length prices in two-sided markets. Finally, we find that differences in national tax rates may be welfare enhancing, despite the use of (abusive) transfer prices as a profit-shifting device.

Keywords: Multinational Enterprises; Two-Sided Markets; Profit Shifting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Profit-shifting in Two-sided Markets (2009)
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DOI: 10.1080/13571516.2010.513815

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