Differentiation and Cost Asymmetry: Solving the Merger Paradox

J. Alejandro Gelves

International Journal of the Economics of Business, 2014, vol. 21, issue 3, 321-340

Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of product differentiation and of cost asymmetry on the merger paradox using a Cournot framework. It finds that when all firms share the same costs, two-firm mergers in an n firm market generate at least no profit loss when goods are sufficiently differentiated. This result contrasts with that of Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) where mergers of strategic substitutes are rarely profitable, and Deneckere and Davidson (1985) where competition among strategic complements yields profitable mergers. Critically, when costs are asymmetric, a merger between an efficient and inefficient firm, with differentiated products, can be more profitable to participants than to excluded rivals. Following this merger, welfare is shown to increase given that the cost asymmetry between insiders is large enough.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/13571516.2014.959258

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