Choice of Distribution System in the New Zealand Life Insurance Industry

Mike Adams

International Journal of the Economics of Business, 1996, vol. 3, issue 2, 213-226

Abstract: Using 1988-93 panel data drawn from the New Zealand life insurance industry, this paper examines empirically the notion that the choice of distribution system is an efficient contracting solution to incentive conflicts between owners, managers and sales agents in life insurance firms. Consistent with what was hypothesised, the empirical results suggest that choice of distribution system is distinguished by organisational form, firm size, and sales commission. However, contrary to expectations, the variables representing product diversity and asset specificity were found not to be statistically significant. The empirical results thus lend mixed support for prior predictions.

Keywords: New institutional economics; Life insurance; Distribution system; New Zealand, JEL classifications: G22, L22, M21, (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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DOI: 10.1080/758528454

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