How US Antitrust Can Be On Target: The Brand-Name Prescription Drug Litigation

Roy Weinstein and John Culbertson

International Journal of the Economics of Business, 1997, vol. 4, issue 3, 257-264

Abstract: Retail pharmacies have alleged that sellers of brand-name Pharmaceuticals illegally agreed not to sell at discounted prices to retail pharmacies. In this paper, we analyze the theory offered by defendants that their price discrimination can be explained as independent, profit-maximizing conduct, not collusion. The court, in a preliminary decision found evidence of illegal agreements among sellers of brand-name pharmaceuti-cals. We conclude that the theory of independent action ultimately fails as an explanation for this price discrimination

Keywords: Collusion; Price discrimination; Pharmaceuticals, JEL classifications: L41, L65, (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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DOI: 10.1080/758523206

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