Cartels, Spontaneous Price Discrimination and International Pharmacy Retailing

W. Duncan Reekie

International Journal of the Economics of Business, 1997, vol. 4, issue 3, 279-285

Abstract: This paper examines the nature of pharmacy retail distribution in several different countries. Evidence in the market place supports the view that innovations in distribution technology are or could be plentiful; conversely, because of institutional rigidities bolstered by law, retail pharmacists in many countries are successfully participating in a cartel-like environment where those innovations are retarded. The outcome is often perverse. Retailers do not achieve economies of scale (a common argument in favour of cartels), while consumers do not experience the lower prices resulting from inter-firm rivalry (a common argument in favour of diffuse ownership)

Keywords: Pharmaceutical industry; Retail pharmacies; Antitrust policy; Health care, JEL classifications: K21, L41, L65, I11, (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1080/758523210

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