The Outsourcing "Prince": Models of Supply Chain Governance in the Italian Automobile Districts

Serafino Negrelli

Industry and Innovation, 2004, vol. 11, issue 1-2, 109-125

Abstract: The main hypothesis of this paper is that the economic and social risks of outsourcing for individual and collective actors can be reduced or better controlled if the decentralization processes are the subject of innovative forms of negotiated regulation. But models of supply chain governance are very different not only across countries, e.g. between Italy and the USA, but also across territories within the same country, as in the case of the Italian automobile districts. The results of comparative empirical studies of outsourcing in the USA and Italy underline differences in the form of social regulation, more competitive in the former than the latter. But a comparative analysis of the two Italian regions of Piedmont and Basilicata reveals very divergent territorial patterns of supply chain governance alongside some common tendencies in relation to innovation, industrial relations, and human resource management.

Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1080/1366271042000200475

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