The formation of status asymmetric ties: a perspective of positive externality and empirical test
Guangxi Zhang and
Muammer Ozer
Industry and Innovation, 2015, vol. 22, issue 7, 625-647
Abstract:
Previous studies have investigated the circumstances that motivate firms to form status asymmetric ties. However, these studies have mainly focused on firm attributes or environmental factors. Deviating from prior works, we propose that firms can take advantage of alliance portfolios to trade resources with potential partners’ status. Specifically, a firm that can access high-quality portfolio technological resources can better realize exchanges with partners’ status. The degree of positive externality depends on the relationships of focal firms with existing partners and their capabilities to utilize external knowledge resources. Data of alliances formed in the computer industry in the USA reveal that a focal firm is more likely to ally with a high-status partner if it can access high-quality portfolio technological resources. Such positive externality of portfolio technological resources is stronger when the focal firm has more repeated ties with its existing partners and when they utilize more external knowledge resources.
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:indinn:v:22:y:2015:i:7:p:625-647
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DOI: 10.1080/13662716.2015.1116979
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