R&D Spillovers, Technology Cartel, and Monopoly Regulation

Sang-Ho Lee

International Economic Journal, 1998, vol. 12, issue 3, 77-88

Abstract: In the presence of R&D spillovers, this paper analyzes the regulated firms' R&D performances according to their noncooperative or cooperative R&D activities. First, it analyzes the R&D equilibrium in local (natural) monopolies, examines its welfare effects, and finds some relationship between output regulation and R&D performance. Next, it proposes an optimal R&D subsidy mechanism that induces regulated firms to implement the social optimum, and discusses about the regulatory R&D subsidies policy. [L5, H21]

Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1080/10168739800000030

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