The Role of Gatt in Trade Negotiations: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

Kim Gi-Hong

International Economic Journal, 2000, vol. 14, issue 4, 103-123

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to explain theoretically the role of GATT in tariff negotiations, without narrowly interpreting GATT as an agreement. This paper, which establishes a game model where two nations are involved in tariff negotiations, shows the following points. First, free trade is difficult to realize even in a world with complete information. Second, GATT can serve as a mechanism for nations to find a particular cooperative tariff under incomplete information. Third, gradual tariff reduction can be explained as the interaction between the gradual decline of domestic political pressure and multilateral tariff negotiations under GATT. [F13]

Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10168730000000038 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:intecj:v:14:y:2000:i:4:p:103-123

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RIEJ20

DOI: 10.1080/10168730000000038

Access Statistics for this article

International Economic Journal is currently edited by Jaymin Lee Editor

More articles in International Economic Journal from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().