A Coalition-Form Analysis Of The “One Country - One Vote” Rule In The Governing Council Of The European Central Bank

Ulrich Bindseil

International Economic Journal, 2001, vol. 15, issue 1, 145-164

Abstract: This paper analyses the “one country—one vote” rule for monetary policy decision making of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank in a framework of cooperative game theory. The Shapley value is used as a solution concept. In contrast to former papers analysing the allocation of abstract "voting power" in committees of international organisations, preferences for monetary policy are modelled to obtain a prediction about potential transfers implied by an equal allocation of voting rights when countries are of different size. It is shown that if the number of countries participating to a currency union grows and the weight of the largest country within the currency union becomes small, the allocation of voting rights becomes irrelevant in the sense that transfers per country tend in any case to zero. [C71, E5, F02]

Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1080/10168730100000007

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