Coase and the Reform of Securities Markets

Simon Johnson

International Economic Journal, 2002, vol. 16, issue 1, 1-19

Abstract: A growing body of evidence indicates that legal rules matter for corporate Governance around the world. Countries with stronger investor protection have more Developed capital markets, and find it easier to finance economic development. Weak Corporate governance also appears to make companies and countries vulnerable to large collapses. The origin of the institutions lies with the history of competing political Systems within Europe and colonization outside of Europe. Despite the importance of long-standing historical influences, Effective legal reform has proved possible in some Cases. The most successful reforms to date are those that implement US standards of Disclosure. [G30, G38, K22, P10]

Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1080/10168730200000001

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