Endogenous Choice of Trade Instrument Under Uncertainty

Jean-Philippe Gervais () and Harvey Lapan

International Economic Journal, 2002, vol. 16, issue 4, 75-96

Abstract: This Paper endogenizes the choice between import tariffs and quotas of two policy active countries in a duopsonistic world market. Without uncertainty, import quotas are welfare superior to import tariffs in equilibrium. If two importers can precommit to a type of instrument before deciding the level of the instrument to use in a future period, an import quota equilibrium emerges. We introduce asymmetric risk in the import demand schedule of the two importers. There exists a range of parameters in which a mixed equilibrium emerges, i.e. one country uses a tariff while the other restricts trade with an import quota. The likelihood that both importers choose a different trade instrument in equilibrium is increasing with the correlation coefficient of the two random shocks. [F13]

Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1080/10168730200000029

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