EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

A model of liability dollarization and myopic governments

Adam Honig

International Economic Journal, 2006, vol. 20, issue 3, 343-355

Abstract: Liability dollarization of the domestic banking system represents a source of vulnerability for emerging market countries. The root cause is a lack of faith in the domestic currency, which ultimately stems from the belief that the government will not follow policies that promote long-run currency stability. This paper presents a model in which government myopia determines the unofficial dollarization of bank credit. Specifically, myopic politicians will choose low interest rates to expand short-run output in order to get re-elected, but this choice has the long-run consequence of increasing dollar lending. Increased liability dollarization is shown to force the hand of future decision-makers into choosing fixed exchange rates because of the fear that large depreciations will destroy balance sheets. The results imply that institutional reforms are necessary to reverse liability dollarization.

Keywords: Liability dollarization; government myopia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10168730600879414 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:intecj:v:20:y:2006:i:3:p:343-355

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RIEJ20

DOI: 10.1080/10168730600879414

Access Statistics for this article

International Economic Journal is currently edited by Jaymin Lee Editor

More articles in International Economic Journal from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:20:y:2006:i:3:p:343-355