Tax Compliance by Trust and Power of Authorities

Stephan Muehlbacher and Erich Kirchler

International Economic Journal, 2010, vol. 24, issue 4, 607-610

Abstract: The following is a summary of Kirchler et al.'s (2008a) framework for tax compliance. The 'slippery slope' framework distinguishes two forms of compliance. Whereas voluntary compliance is driven by trust in tax authorities, enforced compliance depends on the power of authorities. It is assumed, however, that the interplay of trust and power is crucial for both forms of compliance. The framework serves as a guideline for tax research and tax policy.

Keywords: Tax compliance; trust; power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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DOI: 10.1080/10168737.2010.526005

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