Domestic Unionization and the Political Economy of Strategic Export Policy

Koichi Kagitani

International Economic Journal, 2010, vol. 25, issue 3, 493-512

Abstract: This paper examines the effect of lobbying by a labor union and its parent firm on the argument for strategic export policy in a third market-unionized duopoly. The lobbying-induced export policy frequently deteriorates domestic welfare as compared with free trade. It is true that the politically-determined export policy can improve domestic welfare if the union's bargaining power is strong and the domestic government's responsiveness to political contributions is weak. However, even if the conditions are met, implementing the lobbying-induced export policy will not enhance domestic welfare more than improving labor--management relations. Moreover, the improvement of their relations will be hampered by the opportunity of their lobbying. These results indicate that strategic export policy toward a unionized duopoly should be restrained in light of political economy.

Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:intecj:v:25:y:2011:i:3:p:493-512

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DOI: 10.1080/10168737.2011.607257

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