Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Size Effects

Sanghack Lee and Shi-Young Lee

International Economic Journal, 2015, vol. 29, issue 2, 343-358

Abstract: We examine the allocation of prizes in contests in which the number of contenders affects the prizes and costs. We assume that there are two groups of contenders. The government allocates a prize to the two groups, and the contenders in each group respectively compete for the prize. Examining the prize allocation in such contests, we obtain the following results. The aggregate effort increases in the prize share of the larger group. In contests with size effects through costs, the aggregate resource expended in the contests and the aggregate payoffs are independent of group size distribution if the prize is allocated in proportion to group size. The integration of contests with size effects through prizes can yield higher aggregate effort and payoffs than the decentralized contests.

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/10168737.2014.992034 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:intecj:v:29:y:2015:i:2:p:343-358

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RIEJ20

DOI: 10.1080/10168737.2014.992034

Access Statistics for this article

International Economic Journal is currently edited by Jaymin Lee Editor

More articles in International Economic Journal from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().