Do Competing Health Insurance Licensors Provide Pro-patient Effects?

Manouchehr Mokhtari, Doha Abdelhamid, Mamak Ashtari () and Edmond D. Shenassa

International Economic Journal, 2015, vol. 29, issue 4, 571-596

Abstract: This paper shows that competition among health insurance licensors has strong pro-patient effects, if inter-regulatory competition is allowed. The pro-patient effects of the competition among health insurance licensors do not depend on the need for the patients to form or exercise their political influence, such as, forming cooperatives or voting, as suggested by Backer's pressure group theory. When inter-jurisdictional transactions are allowed, endogenous policy making ensures that the health care licensors pursue public interests at no costs to patients.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/10168737.2015.1081261

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