Voting in a Pandemic: Lessons From the 2020 South Korean Legislative Election
In Kyung Kim and
Kyoo il Kim
International Economic Journal, 2022, vol. 36, issue 3, 362-381
Abstract:
In this paper, we examine the extent to which a government's response to a pandemic affects election outcomes. Using detailed data on South Korea's 21st legislative election, held in April 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, we find that a candidate of the ruling Democratic Party was less preferred in electoral districts where the COVID-19 infection rate was higher. We also find that the South Korean government's successful control of the disease contributed significantly to the overwhelming victory of the ruling party against the leading opposition party. Specifically, our counterfactual analysis predicts that each party would have taken 129 and 102 of the 231 constituency seats considered in the analysis, respectively, had the COVID infection rate been the same as the OECD average during the election period. Given that the observed result was 147 to 84, this implies that 18 electees of the ruling party would have lost to the candidates of the leading opposition party, which in turn would have granted the opposition party the ability to block any attempt by the ruling party to fast-track debatable bills.
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:intecj:v:36:y:2022:i:3:p:362-381
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DOI: 10.1080/10168737.2022.2090593
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