Bank Influence and the Failure of US Monetary Policy during the 1953-54 Recession

Edwin Dickens

International Review of Applied Economics, 1998, vol. 12, issue 2, 221-240

Abstract: This paper presents archival and econometric evidence that challenges the conventional belief that independent central banks are necessary to stabilise economies on non-inflationary growth paths. The evidence suggests that, when the US central bank—the Federal Reserve—became independent of democratic control in March 1951, it became dependent on the large banks. It is shown that excessive banker influence caused the Federal Reserve to miss its first opportunity to stabilise the economy, during the 1953-54 recession.

Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1080/02692179800000004

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