Political Freedom, External Liberalization and Financial Stability
Christian Weller () and
Laura Singleton
International Review of Applied Economics, 2004, vol. 18, issue 1, 1-22
Abstract:
The chance of financial crises has grown in emerging economies in recent decades. Increasingly, the interest has shifted away from market-based reforms, such as more transparency, towards potentially stabilizing institutions. Among these institutions are better political freedoms, as they could help to foster stronger and more stable domestic demand growth. Using data from the IMF and Freedom House, we test the effectiveness of political freedoms, in particular of civil liberties and political rights, in reducing the chance of banking and currency crises. Our results show that more civil liberties, which are closely linked to worker rights, lower the chance of banking and currency crises, while political rights have no effect on the chance of financial crises. Also, this effect disappears in more open economies, likely due to increased capital mobility.
Keywords: Banking crisis; currency crisis; labor standards; emerging economies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0269217032000148636 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:irapec:v:18:y:2004:i:1:p:1-22
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/CIRA20
DOI: 10.1080/0269217032000148636
Access Statistics for this article
International Review of Applied Economics is currently edited by Professor Malcolm Sawyer
More articles in International Review of Applied Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().