Wages, Profits, and Rent-Sharing in an Open Economy

L. Josh Bivens

International Review of Applied Economics, 2006, vol. 20, issue 1, 69-83

Abstract: This paper examines the link between international trade and labor market bargaining power. It reviews simple theories of rent-sharing in closed and open economies. Earlier studies on the issue of rent-sharing implicitly assume a closed economy. This assumption may provide some misleading results, especially for studying current developments in the US labor market. Empirical results suggest that the apparent decline in labor's bargaining power in US manufacturing may be attributable to growing international integration.

Keywords: Wages; rent-sharing; bargaining power; globalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1080/02692170500362678

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