The market for corporate control: do countries and technological regimes matter?

Mirella Damiani and Fabrizio Pompei

International Review of Applied Economics, 2011, vol. 25, issue 6, 725-751

Abstract: Using DATASTREAM and LexisNexis databases, we examine the experience from 1995 to 2005 for eight European countries and 21 sectors, and compute the frequency of merger transactions at sectoral level, controlling for the roles of country variables and focusing on distinct technological patterns of innovation. We found that, even in market‐based countries, where transfer of control is a frequent phenomenon, mergers are less frequent in those sectors where innovation follows cumulative processes and where takeovers represent a ‘breach of knowledge.’ This study provides empirical support to the fruitful line of research of varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001) and shows that sectoral differences in M&A (mergers and acquisitions) may be seen in their complementarities with differences by country and their institutional frameworks. Results confirm that acquisitions may occur even in those economies where block‐holders are present, but where the good quality of institutions leaves no space for defence against takeovers. It also highlights the significant role played by takeover regulation, and suggests that the recent reforms in European harmonization should be implemented, so that the obstacles impeding takeovers can be removed. However, policy‐makers should also try to identify for which economies and sectoral fields of specialization, merger activities produce more beneficial effects and which turn out to be detrimental.

Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/02692171.2011.557045 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:irapec:v:25:y:2011:i:6:p:725-751

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/CIRA20

DOI: 10.1080/02692171.2011.557045

Access Statistics for this article

International Review of Applied Economics is currently edited by Professor Malcolm Sawyer

More articles in International Review of Applied Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().