Ownership Structure and Board Effectiveness as Determinants of TMT Compensation in Spanish Listed Firms

Gregorio Sanchez-Marin, J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler and M. Encarnacion Lucas-Perez

Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2010, vol. 12, issue 1, 92-109

Abstract: This study analyzes the influence of ownership structure and the board of directors on top management team (TMT) pay levels in a sample of Spanish listed firms. When panel data methodology is applied, the results show that TMT pay level is affected by the supervisory effectiveness of the board. This, in turn, is influenced by ownership concentration and the type of major shareholders. When ownership is dispersed, the board is more effective in their supervision and TMT pay level is lower. However, when ownership is concentrated, the quality of supervision and, consequently, TMT pay levels depend upon the type of shareholder that is predominant.

Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.3846/16111699.2011.555371

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