EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The value of blockholders shaped by moderators

Maurizio La Rocca and Fabiola Montalto

Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2013, vol. 14, issue sup1, S313-S327

Abstract: This paper investigates the role of moderators in affecting the relationship between ownership and value. The results generally reveal a positive influence of blockholders on performance, that is significantly affected by moderating factors. The link becomes negative in listed firms, as well as in family ones, and vanishes in financial constrained ones. Moreover, in case of managerial opportunism, the role of blockholders increases the positive effect of ownership on performance. Conversely, new governance reforms, improving the investors' protection, have resized the centrality of the majority shareholder. Overall, results can be used to make recommendations on how to improve corporate and country-specific governance mechanisms.

Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.3846/16111699.2013.794750 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jbemgt:v:14:y:2013:i:sup1:p:s313-s327

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/TBEM20

DOI: 10.3846/16111699.2013.794750

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Business Economics and Management is currently edited by Izolda Joksiene, Romualdas Ginevicius and Ieva Meidute

More articles in Journal of Business Economics and Management from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:taf:jbemgt:v:14:y:2013:i:sup1:p:s313-s327